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We provide a theory whereby non-benevolent, self-employed households increase their 
expected family size to raise the likelihood that an inside family member will be a good match 
at running the business. Hence, having larger family sizes raises the self-employed 
household’s expected return to their business. Using data from the General Social Survey, we 
find that respondents have approximately .2 to .4 more actual and expected number of 
children if they are self-employed as compared to if they are not self-employed. This 
empirical relationship is established across a broad array of sub-samples using a simple 
differences in means test. As well, the empirical relationship holds using a regression 
framework, including the use of instrumental variables estimation to allow for the possibility 
of endogeneity of the respondent’s self-employment status and whether the respondent’s 
spouse stays at home. 
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It is well known that agents facing risk and uncertainty on their own ﬁnd it optimal to seek
arrangements to mitigate that risk. These arrangements could be market based, such as insurance
schemes, which could be privately or publicly-provided. But, it is also well known that such schemes
are never complete, as agency problems and other types of frictions preclude the provision of full
insurance. As a result, agents continue to seek other forms of insurance, despite the exclusivity
clauses in many of the formal insurance contracts. These other forms of arrangements, which are
typically referred to as non-market arrangements, fall outside the market-based ones, and are used
to complete or to substitute for the presence or lack thereof of market based insurance schemes. For
example, family co-insurance arrangements, which include inter-vivos transfers as well as bequests,
familial loans and other forms of ﬁnancial assistance, are typically geared to assist family members
in need – for example, see Cox (1987), Arnott and Stiglitz (1991), Altig and Davis (1992), and
Bernheim and Kolikoﬀ (2001).
Implicit in these non-market arrangements, however, is the assumption that somehow the
agents involved in the co-insurance arrangements ﬁnd it optimal to adhere to their promises, which
are normally made ex-ante. That is, it is possible that promises of help made before an accident,
are reneged on after the fact. Or, the presence of such transfers may induce moral hazard type
problems, leading to the failure of such arrangements. Thus, the question is what mitigates such
situations? Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) suggest ‘peer monitoring’ as one mechanism through which
agency problems among co-insuring agents can be mitigated. Chami and Fischer (1996) show that
trust may preclude the need for costly monitoring, as trust does away with the gains from such
type of externalities. But trust or mutual caring are only important here in the sense that they
insure that agents through such sentiments can ﬁnd a match, that is a person who shares their
views, ideals, or their preferences, which would help reduce the agency problem, and preclude costly
negotiations or the need for monitoring. But, the question now is how can one be sure of ﬁnding
that agent who shares similar preferences?
In this paper, we explore this insight further in the context of self-employed agents. Such
individuals present a natural example of individuals facing risk on their own, and who are in need of
1ﬁnding ways of mitigating such needs. One way could be through marriage. Recently, Chami and
Hess (2002) and Hess (2004) explore theoretical and empirical aspects of individuals who attempt
to oﬀset idiosyncratic risk to their incomes by marrying hedges.
Another way in which risks to a family could be oﬀset would be through procreation! The
latter is easier to see in the context of a farmer facing risk, and where having children help mitigate
that risk. Typically, the explanation given is that farmers view children as assets. They help in
farming, among the other tasks that are not easily market substitutable. Indeed, Dasgupta (1995)
provides a number of examples linking the relationship between population growth and economic
incentives and activity in developing economies.
There is, however, another compelling reason as to why farmers, like other self-employed
agents may decide to have more children. Farmers, like other family-business owners, share a very
important concern, unlike other economic agents, who are employed in the market place. They are
concerned with insuring that the farm or family-owned business continues and prospers, even after
they are gone. Thus, succession is a major factor that motivates founders to choose a single child
to inherit the business. Having more children, despite its costs, would go a long way to ﬁnding
that person who shares the parents love for the business, or in other words, is as close as possible
to a perfect match. It is estimated that in the US and most western economies, more than 75 %
of all family ﬁrms are transferred to one child (see Gersick et. al. 1997), and that number is much
higher in developing economies. Thus the business is not looked on as wealth to be shared equally
among the siblings. In many cases, the parent chooses one child to run the business, where the
other members are given side payments, but are not involved in managing the business – e.g., see
the famous Vanderbilt case described in Clark (1966). Moreover, this motive for choosing an heir is
not altruistically motivated; rather it is purely predicated on the presumption that the child with
the closest match to the parent, would ensure the continued success of the business. Such a move
would, in turn, maximize the value of the ﬁrm to the parent/owner, and perhaps even to his or her
children if a bequest is made.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we present a theory whereby self-employed
households choose their consumption plans as well as their family size, and we empirically analyze
2the predictions in Section 3. More speciﬁcally, in sub-Section 3.1 we describe the data used in this
study, and in sub-Section 3.2 we provide simple tests of the diﬀerences in means and regression
analysis to test whether self-employed parents have more children. As well, we explore in sub-
Section 3.3 some additional issues that might aﬀect our results on self-employment status and
family size.
2 Theory
We now consider a model of a self-employed individual’s decision to have children. In particular,
we consider a theory based on a parent’s non-benevolent behavior.1 In the model, every individual
born is endowed with an idea in period 0. Some are promising, while others are not. Let s be the
percentage of the population that is endowed with a good idea, and 1 − s be the fraction of the
population that is not. Assume that those endowed without promising ideas can derive a living of
V from a ﬁrm during their period 1 working lives. Such income is, for simplicity, assumed to be
certain. Consumption in period 1 is supported by income less net-savings and the costs of child
rearing, while net-savings supports consumption in period 2. More speciﬁcally, consumption in
periods 1, c1, and 2, c2, equal:
c1 = V − a − α · n and c2 = a
where n is the number of children and α is the per-child cost of raising a child. For simplicity, the
rate of return on net-savings (a) is set equal to zero.
Alternatively, those born with a promising idea can choose to start their own ﬁrms and reap
a potential surplus. Unfortunately, the potential rewards from a start-up business with promising
ideas do not come free – it requires a start-up expense to be paid in period one, and the value of
1 The assumption of non-benevolence is made for simplicity. The model’s main prediction, namely that self-
employed parents have more children, can be shown to work with a standard model of benevolence to their children.
This is so because the key mechanism, whereby having more children raises the parent’s expected value of the business
through an increased likelihood of a good match, remains in place even with benevolence. Indeed, benevolence may
magnify the eﬀect as the enhanced ﬁnancial prospects will raise the parents per-child gift. Mulligan (1997) examines
the interaction between the parent’s altruism and fertility choice, in a model where both fertility and altruism are
endogenous – also see the earlier work by Barro and Becker (1989).
3the good idea is not known until period 2 when the business must be sold to provide the individual
with retirement income. Let ω > 0 be the start-up cost of a new business, and let ˜ V be the
uncertain value of his promising idea in period 1 when of working age. To make matters simple,
let the business yield V in period 1 with a potential surplus in period 2.2 Period 1 consumption is
supported by business income less any net savings and the cost of having children, namely:
c1 = V − ω − a − α · n
In the second period, the self-employed business person attempts to support his second
period consumption by selling the potential surplus created from his business in the second period
to a member of the next generation – e.g. a child. But at what price? Let φ be the true value of the
business’s surplus worth if the business owner ﬁnds the right person who sees the value. However,
as noted above, the key to a family business is that with the insider’s valuation of the business being
private information, it is unlikely that an outsider ’s valuation of the business’s surplus is worth
more than 0. Why? Outsiders know that the family has private information about the business
that may not be currently observed or easily quantiﬁed.3 As a consequence, outsiders will not want
to pay for the business’s surplus – a premium for the business. Of course, an inside family member
may also not see the true value of the ﬁrm. To capture this phenomenon, let us assume that with
probability 1 − p the self-employed business owner does not ﬁnd an insider or outsider match that
sees the full value of the business. Hence, if the business owner does not ﬁnd a match, the value of
his ﬁrm’s surplus is 0 in period 2. Alternatively, with probability p the business owner may ﬁnd an
insider or an outsider who has the skills needed to see the business’s full potential or true value.
Consistent with observed facts, we assume that the business owner sells it to just one individual
and that the owner and purchaser share the surplus. Since the individual who buys the business
will also be endowed with some ideas of his own, the sale price of the business is φλ, where λ is the
fraction of the surplus that the ﬁrm owner keeps.
2Note that it must be incentive compatible for the individual with a promising idea to be willing to undertake a
start-up. This can be achieved by lowering the start-up cost, ω relative to the expected surplus, λφ, described below.
3While the policymakers are currently enthralled with accounting irregularities in large publicly traded companies,
the problem could be much worse in privately-held, family businesses – e.g. chaebols in South Korea. Tax evasion
and under-the-table payments may also be a formidable factor for self-employed businesses. As such, the market
value of these privately held ﬁrms may be extremely diﬃcult for outsiders to determine, though less so for family
insiders.
4To recap, there are two possible outcomes for the business owner in period 2. If he has a
promising idea but does not match with someone who sees the value, then cNM
2 = a. Finally, if
he has a promising idea and ﬁnds a match then cM
2 = a + φλ. Taken together, the self-employed
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As mentioned above, these potential matches and the sale of a business are available only to
the fraction of the population, s, that are born with promising ideas. By comparison, the fraction
of the population 1 − s who are born without promising ideas can be thought of as individuals
where the probability p is zero of ever ﬁnding a promising match for expression (1). Notice that
since starting a new business involves a start-up cost, and since those who start out working lives
without promising ideas do not have a chance to reap any surplus, only those born with promising
ideas will attempt to start a business on their own. Of course, to insure that individuals with
promising ideas are willing to start their own businesses, it must be that the expected return to
doing so (φ · λ) is suﬃciently large relative to the start-up cost ω.
The key to the model is that the probability of ﬁnding a match, p, may be aﬀected by
family size. Consider the following components that go into the probability of an owner of a family
business ﬁnding a match. Let γ0, 0 ≤ γ0 ≤ 1, be the probability that the business owner is
approached by an outsider, who has enough expertise and knowledge to see the true inside value
of the ﬁrm. Furthermore, let γ1, 0 ≤ γ1 ≤ 1, be the per-child probability that a business owner’s
progeny sees the true value of the ﬁrm. For example, if a business owner has a good business but
no children, his chance of ﬁnding a match is γ0. If he has one child it is 1−(1−γ0)·(1−γ1). With
two children, the probability of a match is 1 − (1 − γ0) · (1 − γ1)2. More generally, for “n” number
of children, the probability of ﬁnding a match is:
p(n) = 1 − (1 − γ0) · (1 − γ1)n
5Note that p(n) is increasing in γ0, γ1, and n, where p0(n) = −(1 − γ0) · (1 − γ1)n · log(1 − γ1)≥ 0,
where the equation holds with equality only if γ1 = 0 or γ0 = 1.4 Note that if γ1 = 0, then the
probability of a match is constant and independent of n.
The optimality condition for a turns out to be the standard relationship where the business
owner equates the marginal utility from consumption in period 1 with the expected marginal utility
from consuming in period 2: namely,
U0(c1) − (1 − p(n)) · U0(cNM
2 ) − p(n) · U0(cM
2 ) = 0 (2)
The optimality condition for the number of children, n, is the following:
θ − α · U0(c1) + p0(n) ·
n
U(cM




The ﬁrst two terms of equation (3) represent the standard marginal beneﬁt and marginal cost of
having children. The ﬁnal term, reﬂects the positive impact that having more children has on
making a a positive business match. Note that if having more children does not help in matching,
then γ1 = 0 and p0(n) = 0, so that the last term vanishes.
The key proposition that we want to show is that if having more children increases your
ability to obtain a good match, then self-employed people will have more of them. There are two
distinct eﬀects. The ﬁrst is the direct eﬀect of how γ1 aﬀects the optimality condition for the
optimal choice of the number of children, expression (3). It is straightforward to see that this
direct eﬀect will be positive: from the optimality condition for the number of children, expression
(3), the marginal beneﬁt for having more children rises as long as p0(n) > 0. In other words, if
having more children makes it easier to ﬁnd a successful match, this will raise the desire to have
more children. The second eﬀect is to see how the choice of n is indirectly aﬀected by a change
in γ1 that aﬀects the optimal choice of net-savings in the intertemporal consumption smoothing
4Note that: dp(n)/dγ1 = +(1 − γ0) · n · (1 − γ1)
n−1 > 0.




















Linearizing the system of two unknowns, n and a, and two equations, (2) and (3), and diﬀerentiating



















































Critical to signing the eﬀect is to note that ∂p0(n)/∂γ1 > 0 for 1 > γ1 ≥ 0. 5 It is straightforward
to show that the numerator and denominator are both positive, so that dn/dγ1|γ1=0 > 0.
While the above model provides the important prediction that individuals who are self-
employed will want to have more children than they would if they were not self-employed, it did so
by assuming non-benevolence to their children. As alluded to in footnote 1, this assumption allows
us to present the prediction in the simplest model possible. Indeed, while the optimal number of
children would take into account all the standard costs and beneﬁts to the decision maker of having
an additional child (i.e. child rearing costs, the non-pecuniary utility beneﬁt from having children,
the cost an extra child on watering down the per-child bequest, etc...), the fact remains that as
long as self-employed individuals have an additional matching beneﬁt for having children, that is
increasing the likelihood of the business’s succession, they will choose to have more children. As




00(n) = −(1 − γ0) · (log(1 − γ1))
2 · (1 − γ1)
n < 0,
∂p
0(n)/∂γ1 = (1 − γ0) · (1 − γ1)
n−1 · (1 − n · log(1 − γ1)) > 0.
6In a related paper, Bernheim, Schleifer and Summers (1985) explore the theoretical and empirical aspects of
a strategic bequest motive where parents condition their bequests on the actions of their children’s actions. Our
strategic motive in this paper, endogenizing the number of children, is complementary to their strategic bequest
motive. See Chami (2001) for an extensive theoretical treatment of the issues surrounding strategic bequests and
family businesses.
73 Empirical Analysis
The theoretical model presented above provides a strong prediction: namely, that individuals who
own businesses will have larger preferred family sizes. However, we are confronted with a number
of practical issues when implementing an empirical test of this prediction. First, most data sets
do not comprehensively ask questions about whether an individual is part of a family business.7
However, a type of family business that is consistently and comprehensively recorded in the annual
General Social Survey (GSS) is whether the respondent is self-employed. From the perspective of
our model, self-employment captures the main features we are attempting to proxy in a potential
family business: namely, an individual who owns a business and who at some point would beneﬁt
from selling the business oﬀ to either an outsider or an inside family member.8 Hence, we use
self-employment status throughout the empirical work below to proxy the type of individual who
owns a business and whose preferred family size may be inﬂuenced by the factors identiﬁed in our
theory.
Second, there exists the possibility that the empirical work below, which attempts to identify
how self-employment status may aﬀect the respondent’s preferred number of children, suﬀers from
some type of reverse causality. In other words, perhaps individuals who prefer larger family sizes
decide to choose self-employment over working for some other business. While we cannot ignore this
possibility, we adopt a few measures to help ensure that this problem does not cloud our ﬁndings.
More importantly, we provide instrumental variables estimates which should help overcome any
endogeneity bias from our estimated eﬀect of self-employment status on the respondent’s actual
and expected number of children. As well, we provide additional evidence in sub-section 3.3 that
7This shortcoming is shared by the standard data sets that one might consider to use for testing our prediction –
i.e. the the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) and the
General Social Survey (GSS), as either the question is limited to a speciﬁc age group, or the question changes, or is
just asked in a few years.
8Interestingly, in 1996 the GSS did ask whether the respondent was a member of a family business. The question
asked, “Do you work for pay in a farm or other business owned in whole or in substantial part by a member
or members of your family (parents, grandparents, children, brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles, or ﬁrst cousins?” 54
respondents answered yes, while 1381 responded no. Of the 54 who said yes, about half answered that they were self-
employed. Note that whether an individual works for a family business is not quite the right question for what we are
looking for. For instance, a respondent who works for a family ﬁrm and does not own it (or never anticipates owning
it) would respond ‘Yes’ to the question of working for a family ﬁrm, would likely answer ‘No’ to being self-employed,
and nevertheless would not, according to our line of theory, want to have more children. As this demonstrates,
responses to the self-employment question are likely to be a better proxy for the incentives of an owner of a family
business as compared to the family business question itself.
8indicates that respondents who are self-employed work more hours and do not seem to have more
“family friendly” jobs as compared to workers who are not self-employed. As such, this would
suggest that self-employment status may not be a good haven for workers with lots of children as
a way to better ﬁt their work into their family lives.
3.1 The Data
In this section, we begin by describing the data employed in the paper. The GSS is an annual
survey which asks respondents speciﬁc questions concerning family size and employment status.
As well, it asks numerous other questions which we use to control for demographic variation and
individual heterogeneity in their preferences for family size. The respondents are not re-interviewed
across years so that the data are repeated cross sections rather than a panel. A description of the
variables we examine is presented in the Data Appendix.9
The key variable of interest for this study is a measure of a respondent’s family size. We
adopt a number of measures of this from the data available in the GSS: namely, the respondent’s
actual number of children, KIDS, and their actual plus expected additional children, TOTKIDS.
The latter may be an important measure of family size for younger respondents who may be
planning to add children to their current family size in order to reach their preferred family size.
Of course, the self-employment status of the family is also a key variable of interest in
this study. We denote SELFE to be a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondents report that
they are self-employed, and zero otherwise.10 As discussed above, self-employment is our proxy for
a family business, as self-employment provides perhaps the greatest opportunity to pass down a
business to a member of the next generation of one’s own family. Hence, if our theory is correct, the
motivation for succession and insuring the business’s survival is likely to be key component in the
fertility decisions of the self-employed. To control for additional family related factors inﬂuencing
a respondent’s family size, we allow for a number of variables related to the respondent’s family.
9There are a total number of 15 thousand respondents who were not retired or in school (nor were their spouses if
they had one) and responded to family size and self-employment questions throughout most years in 1972-2002. For
the sample of currently married male respondents who are not in school nor retired (nor are their spouses), summary
statistics for the key variables are reported in the Table 1.
10The exact wording is: ‘ (Are/Were) you self-employed or (do/did) you work for someone else? ’.
9For instance, MARRIED is a dummy variable that indicates whether the respondent is currently
married. As well, SPOUSEH is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the work status of the
respondents spouse was ‘taking care of the house’, and 0 otherwise.
Additional explanatory variables which we use to control for observable factors that can
systematically inﬂuence an agent’s preference for more children are the respondent’s age, AGE,
sex, MALE, and a measure of their perceived ﬁnancial status relative to others, FINRELA.11
We also constructed measures of work and life experience: GENERATION is the year that the
respondent was born, and LMEX is the respondent’s labor market experience, namely their age
minus their number of years of schooling minus 6. We also use highest educational attainment
for the respondent and the spouse as possible controls for the respondent’s preference for children:
DIPHR, DIPJCR, DIPBAR, DIPGDR, DIPHSP, DIPJCSP, DIPBASP, and DIPGDSP are dummy
variables for whether the highest diploma (DIP) was for high school (H), junior college (JC),
four year college (BA) or for graduate school (GD), earned by the respondent (R) and spouse
(SP).12 Additional demographic information is contained in the dummy variables JEWISH and
CATHOLIC, for respondent listed religion, WHITE and BLACK, for whether a respondent lists
this as their race. City size eﬀects are also controlled for: CTYSZ1 is a dummy variable if the
respondent’s residence is less than 10,000, and 0 otherwise. CTYSZ2, CTYSZ3 and CTYSZ4 are
similarly deﬁned for population ranges 10,000 to 100,000, 100,000 to 1 million, and greater than 1
million, respectively.
Finally, we also control for the respondent’s reported INDUSTRY using a series of eleven
dummy variables: Agriculture, Mining, Construction, Manufacturing, Transportation, Wholesale,
Retail, Finance (FIRE), Entertainment, and Public Administration, and Professional Services.
We also use the information on the respondent’s family background that they were raised in:
SIBS is their number of siblings, while IMGRNT, IMGRNTPA and IMGRNTMA are dummy
11FINRELA is measured on a self reported scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being that your ﬁnancial status is well below the
mean, 2 being that it is below the mean, 3 being that it is about the mean, 4 being that it is above the mean, and 5
being that it is far above the mean. While the GSS does report family income for some years, it does not do so for
all years.
12Unfortunately, not all demographic questions are asked for both the respondent and his/her spouse. As noted
below, this leads us to only use Male respondents for the majority of our empirical work. Note that the main result,
that self-employed respondents have more children, holds for the full sample, and a large fraction of the sub-samples,
including Males and Females separately.
10variables that denote whether the respondent, the respondent’s father and mother were immigrants,
respectively. Moreover, ETHNIC ORIGIN denotes the country the respondent’s ancestors came
from: Africa, Austria, French Canada, Other Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, England,
Wales, Finland, France, Germany, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Dutch
Holland, Norway, Philippians, Poland, Puerto Rico, Russia, Scotland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
West Indies, and Other.
3.2 Evidence
In the following sub-sections, we examine the main prediction from our theory: namely, that
individuals who are self-employed are more likely to have larger families than those who are not
self-employed. Sub-section 3.2.1 presents the stylized facts of the data we employ for this study.
Sub-section 3.2.2 provides a more formal empirical test of our hypothesis.
3.2.1 Empirical Regularities
Table 1 provides an interesting set of empirical regularities in the data. For purposes described
below, the primary data set we examine in this study includes only currently married males who
are neither currently enrolled in school nor retired nor are their spouses.13 The ﬁrst column of the
data lists variable names, while columns two through four present the variable’s mean, standard
deviation and median. The ﬁnal three columns of the table report the correlation coeﬃcient between
the variable in the ﬁrst column and the three key variables of interest in this study: namely, KIDS,
KIDSTOT, and SELFE, respectively. As reported in the table, the respondent’s average number
of actual and expected children is 2.2 and 2.4, respectively, while the average number of siblings
is relatively larger at 3.8. The average respondent is just over 40 years old, has over 13 years of
schooling and has approximately 23 years of labor market experience. The majority of the sample
reports their race as WHITE, their religion as PROTESTANT and lives in a city size of under
13As we demonstrated below in Tables 2 and 4, the general ﬁnding that respondents who report that they are self-
employed have signiﬁcantly more children hold for both men and women. However, while the GSS reports the spouse’s
self employment status, it does not provide much of the important demographic information for the respondent’s
spouse. Hence we believe that given data availability the male only sample provides a more comprehensive picture
of the relationship between self-employment status and family size.
11100,000 (CTYSZ1 and CTSZ2 combined).14
The correlation coeﬃcients reported in Table 1 also reveal a number of interesting ﬁndings
between the variables of interest. First, as expected, the actual and expected number of children
are highly correlated. Consequently, other variables have similar correlation patterns with these
two variables. Second, age and labor market experience are positively and signiﬁcantly correlated
with the actual and expected number of children. Moreover, these correlations are large. Also of
interest, the respondent’s education is negatively correlated with the number of children, while his
number of siblings and whether his wife works in the home is positively correlated with his number
of children. Also, respondents that are BLACK, or from smaller cities, or that are CATHOLIC,
tend to have more children.
Finally, approximately 18 percent of the respondents list themselves as ‘self-employed’.15
Interestingly, self-employment status and the number of children is positively and signiﬁcantly
correlated. Also, self-employment status appears to be higher for older respondents with more labor
market experience, as well as for those who report themselves as JEWISH. Finally, consistent with
Fairlie and Meyer (1996,2000), self-employment is signiﬁcantly higher for WHITE’s and lower for
BLACK’s.16 Moreover, as indicated by their signiﬁcant negative correlations with GENERATION,
both self-employment and the number of children have decreased over time. As such, this will be
an important variable to control for in our regression results below in sub-Section 3.2.2.17,18
Table 2 presents the diﬀerence of means by self-employment status. The ﬁrst column of the
14Friedlander and Silver (1967) argue that less dense populations are likely to have lower living costs, and thus
would be more likely to have higher fertility rates.
15Again, this is for married men who are not retired, nor in school, nor are their spouses. The mean self-employment
rate for women is 8.8 percent for married women who satisfy this same criteria.
16Fairlie and Meyer (2000) test several hypotheses in order to explain the diﬀerence in black and white self-
employment rates. These hypotheses center on whether demographic changes have led to a decrease in the black/white
gap and whether the black/white gap is due primarily to the historically low self-employment rates and past inexperi-
ence of blacks. They ﬁnd that demographic changes that occurred in the twentieth century did not have a large eﬀect
on the black/white self-employment gap and using a simple intergenerational model of self-employment they ﬁnd
that it is not only initial conditions that explain low black self-employment but also continuing forces that depress
black self-employment (i.e. discrimination or skills, capital, and intangibles that are passed intergenerationally).
17To note, the regression results not only include GENERATION as a right hand side variable, but they also
include dummy variables for the year in which the interview took place.
18The four largest industries represented among the self employed are (in order) Finance, Construction, Professional
Services, and Agriculture, respectively. The latter, which accounts for about 14 percent of the self employed in our
sample but are only 4 percent of sample, is excluded from our baseline empirical work in columns (V II) and (V III)
of Table 4. The results are unaﬀected by their exclusion.
12Table 1: Sample Statistics
CORRELATIONS
VARIABLE MEAN STD MEDIAN KIDS KIDSTOT SELFE
KIDACT 2.215 1.593 2
KIDSTOT 2.411 1.546 2 .922∗∗∗
SELFE .182 .386 0 .069∗∗∗ .058∗∗∗
FINRELA 3.113 .827 3 −.064∗∗∗ −.079∗∗∗ .027∗
LMEX 23.2 12.8 21 .421∗∗∗ .294∗∗∗ .132∗∗∗
AGE 42.6 12.1 41 .392∗∗∗ .261∗∗∗ .150∗∗∗
GENERATION 1944.9 13.5 1947 −.390∗∗∗ −.302∗∗∗ −.134∗∗∗
SPWRKH .341 .474 0 .164∗∗∗ .162∗∗∗ .002
SIBS 3.812 3.194 3 .170∗∗∗ .186∗∗∗ −.034∗∗
DIPHR .850 .357 1 −.214∗∗∗ −.200∗∗∗ −.003
DIPJCR .054 .226 0 −.043∗∗∗ −.023 −.055∗∗∗
DIPBAR .177 .382 0 −.103∗∗∗ −.103∗∗∗ .029∗
DIPGDR .103 .304 0 −.040∗∗∗ −.047∗∗∗ .052∗∗∗
DIPHSP .590 .492 1 .010 .008 .000
DIPJCSP .061 .240 0 −.037∗∗∗ −.036∗∗ −.005
DIPBASP .157 .364 0 −.101∗∗∗ −.083∗∗∗ .031∗∗
DIPGDSP .057 .231 0 −.076∗∗∗ −.084∗∗∗ .007
BLACK .077 .267 0 .081∗∗∗ .080∗∗∗ −.074∗∗∗
WHITE .885 .319 1 −.076∗∗∗ −.074∗∗∗ .068∗∗∗
JEWISH .020 .140 0 −.024 −.032∗∗ .109∗∗∗
CATHOLIC .275 .447 0 .056∗∗∗ .078∗∗∗ −.052∗∗∗
PROTESTANT .586 .493 1 .014 .003 .020
IMGRNTR .080 .272 0 −.013 −.005 −.022
IMGRNTPA .160 .367 0 .035∗∗ .027∗ .019
IMGRNTMA .144 .351 0 .028∗ .026∗ .019
CTYSZ1 .353 .478 0 .032∗∗ .031∗∗ .068∗∗∗
CTYSZ2 .434 .496 0 −.011 −.014 −.050∗∗∗
CTYSZ3 .164 .371 0 −.021 −.020 −.025
CTYSZ4 .048 .214 0 −.010 −.003 .006
Note: The data sample size is 4220 and includes only currently married male respondents when
neither spouse is retired or in school, MALES† & MAR. See Data Section 3.1 and the Data Appendix
for data descriptions. Column 1 lists the variables. Columns 2 through 4 report the means, standard
deviations and medians. Columns 5 − 7 report the correlations between the variables listed in the
rows with those listed at the top of the columns. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate that the relationship is
diﬀerent from zero at or below the .01, .05 and .10 level of statistical signiﬁcance, respectively.
13table lists the samples of interest, while column two provides the dependent variables, namely KIDS
and KIDSTOT. Columns three through ﬁve report the average number of actual and expected kids
for the full sample, the proportion of the sample that is self-employed, and for the proportion of
the sample that is not self-employed, respectively. Column six presents the p-value of the test that
the means are equal across the two sub-samples (i.e. self-employed and not self employed), while
column seven displays the number of observations for the sample of interest.19 The presentation
of the means and the test of the equality of means across the sub-samples is performed for both
measures of the respondent’s number of children – KIDS and KIDSTOT.
A key and fundamental observation from the Table 2 bears directly on the model’s main
prediction: that is, for the full sample and for 81 out of the 94 sub-samples, the average number
of children, both as measured by KIDS and KIDSTOT, is larger for the self-employed sub-sample
versus the non-self- employed sub-sample. In other words, in 81 out of 94 cases the means in
column (V) are larger than those for column (VI). Moreover, 56 out of the 94 tests of the equality
of the means that are reported in Table 2 are statistically signiﬁcant at or below the .1 level, and
in all these cases the mean number of children of the self-employed is greater than that of the
non-self-employed. And often in these cases where the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence between
the two means fails to be rejected are typically for sub-samples with a small relatively number of
observations. For example, the sample of males living in large cities (CTYSZ3 and CTYSZ4) have
sample sizes of 693 and 203 and fail to show any signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the average number
of children. There are, however, a number of instances where the p-value is below .1 despite the
small sample size. For example, the sample size for Jewish men is only 84 but for both measures
of the dependent variable, the diﬀerence in the means is signiﬁcant at the .1 level. Interestingly,
there does seem to be some regional variation in diﬀerences of the means. These regional variables
will be in the regression results below and are often statistically signiﬁcant.
Table 2 provides some other interesting ﬁndings. First, regardless of their marital status,
men who are self-employed have, on average, a higher number of actual and expected kids as
compared to men that are not self-employed – the diﬀerence in means is signiﬁcant at below the
.01 level. Second, regardless of immigration status and the immigration status of the respondents
19The underlying t-test is obtained using a procedure that is robust to heteroskedasticity of unknown form.
14Table 2: Tests for Diﬀerences in Means by Self-Employment Status
MEANS
Sample Variable FULL SELFE NON-SELFE p-value NOBS
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII)
ALL KIDS 1.83 2.05 1.80 .000 15010
KIDSTOT 2.09 2.24 2.07 .000 15010
ALL MALES KIDS 1.70 2.00 1.64 .000 6859
KIDSTOT 2.01 2.23 1.96 .000 6859
ALL FEMALES KIDS 1.94 2.12 1.92 .003 8151
KIDSTOT 2.16 2.25 2.15 .120 8151
MALES†
& BMAR KIDS 2.18 2.36 2.14 .000 5267
KIDSTOT 2.36 2.50 2.33 .003 5267
& MAR1 KIDS 2.13 2.34 2.08 .000 3372
KIDSTOT 2.34 2.49 2.31 .007 3372
& MAR KIDS 2.22 2.45 2.16 .000 4220
KIDSTOT 2.41 2.60 2.37 .000 4220
MALES† & MAR
& IMGR KIDS 2.14 2.56 2.07 .067 339
KIDSTOT 2.38 2.79 2.31 .086 339
& IMGRPAR KIDS 2.35 2.64 2.28 .020 782
KIDSTOT 2.52 2.78 2.46 .036 782
& CATH KIDS 2.36 2.58 2.32 .069 1161
KIDSTOT 2.61 2.83 2.57 .053 1161
& JEWISH KIDS 1.95 2.20 1.73 .082 84
KIDSTOT 2.06 2.28 1.86 .104 84
& PROTESTANT KIDS 2.23 2.46 2.18 .001 2471
KIDSTOT 2.42 2.59 2.37 .009 2471
& BLACK KIDS 2.66 3.07 2.62 .271 325
KIDSTOT 2.84 3.41 2.79 .190 325
& WHITE KIDS 2.17 2.40 2.12 .000 3735
KIDSTOT 2.37 2.55 2.33 .001 3735
& RACEOTH KIDS 2.33 3.15 2.17 .003 160
KIDSTOT 2.51 3.15 2.38 .017 160
& SPWRKH KIDS 2.58 2.82 2.52 .011 1440
KIDSTOT 2.76 2.92 2.72 .090 1440
& NON-SPWKRH KIDS 2.03 2.25 1.98 .000 2780
KIDSTOT 2.23 2.43 2.19 .001 2780
& CTYSZ1 KIDS 2.29 2.43 2.25 .082 1491
KIDSTOT 2.48 2.59 2.45 .179 1491
& CTYSZ2 KIDS 2.19 2.54 2.13 .000 1833
KIDSTOT 2.39 2.67 2.33 .001 1833
& CTYSZ3 KIDS 2.14 2.29 2.11 .232 693
KIDSTOT 2.34 2.41 2.33 .549 693
& CTYSZ4 KIDS 2.15 2.36 2.10 .366 203
KIDSTOT 2.39 2.69 2.32 .177 203
Note: Continued. 15Continued
Table 2: Tests for Diﬀerences in Means by Self-Employment Status
MEANS
Sample Variable FULL SELF NON-SELF p-value NOBS
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII)
MALES† & MAR
& RELINC12 KIDS 2.42 2.74 2.34 .009 825
KIDSTOT 2.64 2.85 2.60 .102 825
& RELINC3 KIDS 2.20 2.45 2.15 .003 2082
KIDSTOT 2.41 2.64 2.36 .005 2082
& RELINC45 KIDS 2.12 2.28 2.07 .041 1313
KIDSTOT 2.27 2.42 2.24 .068 1313
& NEW ENGLAND KIDS 2.10 2.65 2.00 .021 252
KIDSTOT 2.30 2.89 2.20 .004 252
& MID-ATLANTIC KIDS 2.10 2.24 2.07 .295 667
KIDSTOT 2.28 2.41 2.25 .308 667
& CENTRAL NE KIDS 2.29 2.54 2.24 .052 912
KIDSTOT 2.50 2.67 2.47 .185 912
& CENTRAL NW KIDS 2.37 2.78 2.24 .011 388
KIDSTOT 2.53 2.93 2.41 .010 388
& SOUTH ATL. KIDS 2.05 2.48 1.96 .005 581
KIDSTOT 2.26 2.55 2.20 .064 581
& CENTRAL SE KIDS 2.22 2.18 2.22 .873 245
KIDSTOT 2.32 2.27 2.34 .782 245
& CENTRAL SW KIDS 2.34 2.47 2.31 .412 346
KIDSTOT 2.56 2.56 2.56 .975 346
& PACIFIC KIDS 2.12 2.08 2.13 .789 356
KIDSTOT 2.31 2.29 2.32 .862 356
& NO DIPLOMA KIDS 3.03 3.27 2.97 .153 634
KIDSTOT 3.15 3.38 3.09 .182 634
& HIGH SCHOOL KIDS 2.17 2.33 2.14 .026 2175
KIDSTOT 2.37 2.46 2.35 .201 2175
& JUNIOR COLLEGE KIDS 1.93 2.05 1.92 .694 227
KIDSTOT 2.26 2.57 2.23 .223 227
& BA KIDS 1.86 2.12 1.79 .018 749
KIDSTOT 2.07 2.34 2.00 .010 749
& GRAD KIDS 2.03 2.50 1.88 .000 435
KIDSTOT 2.20 2.59 2.07 .001 435
Note: Continued.
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Table 2: Tests for Diﬀerences in Means by Self-Employment Status
MEANS
Sample Variable FULL SELF NON-SELF p-value NOBS
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII)
MALES† & MAR
& AGRICULTURAL KIDS 2.77 2.85 2.62 0.455 166
KIDSTOT 2.96 2.96 2.95 0.966 166
& MINING KIDS 2.43 2.29 2.44 0.878 61
KIDSTOT 2.61 2.29 2.65 0.725 61
& CONSTRUCTION KIDS 2.39 2.54 2.32 0.217 452
KIDSTOT 2.59 2.73 2.52 0.261 452
& TRANSPORTATION KIDS 2.23 1.96 2.25 0.190 396
KIDSTOT 2.41 2.07 2.43 0.135 396
& WHOLESALE KIDS 2.21 2.21 2.21 0.999 205
KIDSTOT 2.40 2.38 2.41 0.896 205
& RETAIL KIDS 2.10 2.39 2.00 0.040 353
KIDSTOT 2.33 2.44 2.29 0.419 353
& FINANCE KIDS 2.18 2.37 2.08 0.054 552
KIDSTOT 2.39 2.54 2.32 0.142 552
& PUBLIC ADMIN. KIDS 2.11 2.67 2.10 0.319 375
KIDSTOT 2.28 3.00 2.27 0.033 375
& MANUFACTURING KIDS 2.26 2.38 2.25 0.493 1132
KIDSTOT 2.45 2.68 2.43 0.183 1132
& ENTERTAINMENT KIDS 1.78 1.57 1.84 0.645 32
KIDSTOT 2.03 1.71 2.12 0.504 32
& PROFESSIONAL KIDS 2.07 2.42 1.98 0.004 572
KIDSTOT 2.26 2.53 2.20 0.024 572
Note: See Table 1 and Data Section 3.1. Column 1 reports the sample. Column 2 lists the
measures of the number of Children. Columns 3 − 5 report the mean number of Children for the
full sub-sample and then partitioned for the self-employed and non-self-employed portions of these
sub-samples. Column 6 reports the p-value from the test (robust to heteroskedasticity of unknown
form) of the null hypothesis that the means from the two partitioned sub-samples are identical.
NOBS reports the number of observations. MALES† are MALE respondents who are neither retired
nor in school, nor are their spouses.
17father, those who are self-employed have a statistically signiﬁcant higher average number of kids.
Similarly, regardless of the respondents spouses work status (SPOUSEH), and the familys relative
income (FINRELA), men who are self- employed on average tend to have a signiﬁcantly larger
number of actual and expected kids. Finally, there is also some heterogeneity of diﬀerences in the
actual and expected number of children even within industry classiﬁcations. Interestingly, within
each of the Retail, Financial and Professional Services industries, self-employed respondents have
more actual and expected children. These ﬁndings are of interest, as many of these industries are
likely to exemplify the type where a self-employed business could beneﬁt from a child who sees the
private value to the business (e.g. a retail shop, an insurance business, a dentist practice, etc...).20
Taken together, we believe that the results in Table 2 provide extremely strong preliminary evidence
in favor of the prediction: namely, ceteris paribus, self-employed respondents have more children.
3.2.2 Estimation
To test the hypothesis that the self-employed have more kids, we regress measures of family size
(KIDS and KIDSTOT) on a dummy variable for whether the respondent is self-employed (SELFE)
and a number of control variables to proxy for the respondents preferences for their family size.21
The control variables can be thought of as capturing household characteristics and demograph-
ics. Examples of the former are whether or not the spouse stays at home (SPOUSEH) and the
respondents perceived ﬁnancial relative position (FINRELA). Examples of the latter are features
of residential area (CTYSZ), the respondents age (AGE); and trends that may aﬀect the number
of children a couple has over time: year of birth. The model is speciﬁed as follows:
20 That Financial (Finance, Real Estate and Insurance) and Professional Services industries demonstrate this
feature is particularly important for overcoming the following criticism: perhaps the cost of child rearing is cheaper
for the self-employed as they have a source of cheap, unpaid help. While this criticism could apply to some retail
stores (e.g. restaurants), it certainly would not apply to the more skilled professions inherent in Finance, Insurance
and Real Estate or Professional Services.
21Again, as in Table 1, the regression results will be only for married working males, though the results in Table 2
demonstrate that this fact is broader than for just this sub-sample of the data. The focus on men is primarily due to
the data incompleteness for the respondent’s spouse. Since married women are more likely to be part-time employed
as compared to men, their self-employment status is likely to be less important in the fertility decision. Unfortunately,
since we only have the parent’s self- employment status for the respondent but not for the respondent’s spouse, we
are missing crucial information for the instrumental variables estimation when we look at female respondents.
18Ni = β0 + β1 · SELFEi + β2 · Xi + β3 · Ti + i (5)
where Ni represents the number of kids respondent i has or expects to have, Xi represent household
characteristics and demographics of respondent i, and Ti represent time dummy variables for the
year in which the interview was conducted. More speciﬁcally, the following variables are used
as controls: SPOUSEH, FINRELA, JEWISH, CATHOLIC, AGE, AGE2, GENERATION, LMEX,
SIBS, BLACK, WHITE, 8 variables separately denoting the respondent and spouses highest degree
obtained (DIPHR, DIPJCR, DIPBAR, DIPGDR, DIPHSP, DIPJCSP, DIPBASP, and DIPGDSP),
three dummy variables for whether the respondent, father or mother were immigrants to the U.S.
(IMGRNT, IMGRNTPA and IMGRNTMA) 26 ethnic origin dummy variables, dummy variables
for city size (CITYSZ1-4), and the 8 Census regions.22 The data are described fully in the Data
Appendix. Also, Table 1 and 2, as summarized previously, provide some raw data on the variables
of interest and the control variables.
We estimate a number of empirical regressions of KIDS and KIDSTOT on the explanatory
variables. To control for the possibility of endogeneity among some of the explanatory variables
in particular, SELFE and SPOUSEH we also estimated the speciﬁcations using instrumental vari-
ables, IV.23 While our theory predicts that the self-employed will tend to have more kids, we cannot
ignore the possibility that families with more kids will see the beneﬁts of a family business and
choose to become self-employed. Also, since women who stay home instead of work in the market
have more kids, a wife with more kids is more likely to stay at home – see the survey in Blau (1998).
To control for the possibility that SELFE and SPOUSEH may be endogenous, we use a number of
instruments, Z, that explain SELFE and SPOUSEH but are exogenous to KIDS and KIDSTOT.
In particular, the instruments used are whether or not the respondents father was self-employed,
the industry the respondent works in, stability of the respondents household at age 16, the religious
aﬃliation of the respondent at age 16, and the ﬁnancial relative status of the respondent at age
22The speciﬁcations also contains a constant, so that where appropriate a dummy variable is excluded so as to
avoid collinearity.
23More speciﬁcally, the instrumental variables approach we adopt is the two-step eﬃcient Generalized Method of
Moments estimator.
1916.24,25 As demonstrated in the p-values below, together these variables are statistically signiﬁcant
predictors of SELFE and SPOUSEH, and the instruments are not signiﬁcantly correlated with the
error term. As the number of instruments exceeds the number of estimated coeﬃcients, below we
will test the over-identifying restrictions that the residuals and the instruments are orthogonal –
see the p-value of the J-test below.
Table 3 provides estimation results of the speciﬁed key variables for the OLS and IV re-
gressions for KIDS and KIDSTOT, the explanatory variables of interest are presented in column
one and the results for the IV regressions are reported in the odd numbered columns. The table
provides the coeﬃcient estimates, their levels of signiﬁcance, and their standard errors. At the
bottom of Table 3 are reported p-values for several tests to be explained later.
The key result from Table 3 is that, after controlling for a whole host of demographic vari-
ables such as religion, age, labor market experience, race, immigration status and other variables
assumed to inﬂuence the number of kids an individual may choose to have, the estimated coeﬃcient
on SELFE is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at below the .10 level in all regressions. The coef-
ﬁcient estimates from the IV regressions show that a male who is self-employed has approximately
0.4 more kids than his non-self-employed counterpart, and expects to have about 0.5 more kids than
24For example, Hout and Rosen (2002) demonstrate that the oﬀspring of self-employed fathers are more likely
themselves to be self-employed, primarily for the reason we identify: namely, to hand down the business. Indeed,
in our data, the probability of a respondent being self-employed given that his father was self-employed is equal to
.279 (350/1255). In contrast, the probability falls to .141 (417/2965) if the respondent’s father is not self-employed.
The diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at below the .001 level. However, unlike Rees and Shah (1986), we do
not have earnings diﬀerentials to explain self-employment, but rather use industry dummy variables as a proxy.
Moreover, Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1998) ﬁnd evidence that a respondent’s receipt of a gift or inheritance increases
the likelihood of self-employment. Their explanation, consistent with their theory, is that such a windfall reduces
capital constraints on potential entrepreneurs. While such data is not available in the GSS, the likelihood of a gift or
inheritance is likely to be correlated with one of our instruments: namely, the respondent’s ﬁnancial status at age 16.
Interestingly, the ‘succession’ motive for why self-employed parents have more children may be connected to this
‘borrowing constraint’ literature for the following reason: The within-family succession of a self-employed business is
less likely to fail because of borrowing constraints as compared to the sale of the business to an individual outside
the family. The reason is that families can use informal and non-market arrangements to compensate the parents for
the business. Moreover, the existence of borrowing constraints would make it even less likely for a business owner
to sell the business at a fair market price to an outsider, in addition to the information and monitoring reasons we
have already discussed. Hence, the fact that potential buyers outside the family will be more likely to be borrowing
constrained as compared to inside family members will magnify the desire of the self-employed to have more children
in order to raise the chances of obtaining a good internal match for the business’s succession.
25In general, the instruments are good predictors of the potentially endogeneous regressors. In Tables 3 and 4, the
p-value for SELFE and SPOUSEH reports the signiﬁcance level of the F-test that, in a ﬁrst stage regression, the
coeﬃcients n the instrumental variables Z are not all jointly equal to zero when regressed against these variables.
In all cases, the p-value for SELFE is below .001 (with an associated F-statistic of over 30, while the p-value for
SPOUSEH ranges from .01 to .1, with an associated F-statistic of about 3. As the former is the basis of inquiry for
this study, we believe that our list of instruments is a good one.
20Table 3: Baseline Regression of Number of Children on Self-Employment Status
Dep. Variable KIDS KIDSTOT
Estimator OLS IV OLS IV
SELFE .139∗∗∗ .407∗∗ .161∗∗∗ .486∗∗∗
(.059) (.183) (.061) (.185)
SPWRKH .420∗∗∗ .553 .353∗∗∗ .030
(.049) (.627) (.050) (.643)
FINRELA −.066∗∗ −.062∗∗ −.074∗∗ −.079∗∗
(.029) (.030) (.029) (.031)
JEWISH −.084 −.170 −.097 −.188
(.175) (.179) (.177) (.180)
CATHOLIC .159∗∗∗ .170∗∗∗ .229∗∗∗ .252∗∗∗
(.058) (.059) (.059) (.060)
AGE .162∗∗∗ .162∗∗∗ .075∗∗∗ .057∗
(.023) (.034) (.024) (.035)
AGE2/100 − .184∗∗∗ − .189∗∗∗ − .091∗∗∗ − .082∗∗∗
(.013) (.022) (.014) (.022)
GENERATION −.015∗ −.014 −.013 −.018
(.008) (.012) (.008) (.012)
LMEX .039∗∗ .043∗∗ .026 .030
(.019) (.019) (.020) (.019)
SIBS .040∗∗∗ .040∗∗∗ .049∗∗∗ .048∗∗∗
(.009) (.009) (.011) (.011)
BLACK .765∗∗∗ .748∗∗ .708∗∗ .717∗∗
(.298) (.298) (.294) (.290)
WHITE −.042 −.056 −.012 −.007
(.169) (.168) (.163) (.160)
IMGRNTR .082 .074 .164 .175
(.139) (.138) (.140) (.137)
IMGRNTPA −.198∗∗ −.218∗∗ −.230∗∗ −.224∗∗
(.100) (.106) (.100) (.107)
IMGRNTMA −.073 −.057 −.085 −.083
(.109) (.109) (.111) (.110)
p-values
YEARS .623 .594 .000 .000
City Size .021 .026 .169 .191
Diplomas .000 .039 .002 .022
Region .000 .000 .000 .000





Notes: See Tables 1 and 2. Estimated standard errors, robust to heteroskedasticity of unknown form, in
parentheses. IV refers to two-step eﬃcient GMM. The data sample is for MALES† & MAR, with 4220
observations in each regression. P-values for YEARS, City Size, Diplomas, Region and Ethnic Origin are
from F-tests from excluding the linearly independent time dummies, CITYSZ1-3, the eight respondent and
spouse diploma variables, seven Census regions and 34 Ethnic origin dummy variables, respectively. Hausman
is the p-value for the speciﬁcation test that the coeﬃcients on SELFE and SPWRKH are the same across
the OLS and IV estimates. J-test is the p-value for the Hansen test that the residuals are uncorrelated with
the instruments, Z. SELFE and SPOUSEH are p-values for the test that, in a ﬁrst stage regression, the
coeﬃcients on the instrumental variables Z are not all jointly equal to zero when regressed against these
variables.
21a male of equal standing but who is non-self-employed. For the OLS regressions, the coeﬃcient
estimates on SELFE are not as large in magnitude, though they are still statistically signiﬁcant in
all four columns. These results indicate that a self employed male has .139 more kids and expects
to have .161 more kids than a male who is not self-employed.
An important result that is in accordance with previous research on the optimal number of
kids is that the coeﬃcient on FINRELA is negative and signiﬁcant at the .05 level. The negative
relationship between income and fertility decisions found in previous studies is assumed to explain
a households decision to spread risk across children – see Appelbaum and Katz (1991) as well as
Mulligan (1997). Another important result studied by many researchers is the role the mothers
involvement in the labor market has to do with a households decision to have kids. Previous research
has found that there is a negative relationship between a wifes labor market participation and the
number of kids she gives birth to – see Willis (1973), Robinson and Tomes (1982), and Rosenzweig
and Schultz (1985).26 Whether or not the spouse stays at home is positive and highly signiﬁcant
in both OLS regressions but loses its signiﬁcance when instrumented for in the IV regressions – see
footnote 31.
Some other interesting results observed in Table 3 are that the CATHOLIC variable is
positive and signiﬁcant at the .01 level in each one of the regressions. Individuals who are Catholic
tend to have approximately .16 more kids and tend to expect approximately .23 more kids. The
JEWISH variable is negative in all regressions, though it is not statistically signiﬁcant. Older
men tend to have more actual and expected children, while the coeﬃcient on the GENERATION
variable, which is used to capture the change in demographics and changes in family structure over
time, is negative for each of the regressions but is only signiﬁcant for 1 of the 4 regressions. LMEX
which is used to measure the husbands stability in the workforce which in turn provides a measure
of the stability of the household is positive in all four of the regressions but only signiﬁcant in
both the OLS and the IV regressions for KIDS, a male with an additional year of labor market
experience appears to have approximately .04 more kids.
Individual characteristics, for the most part, are as expected. The more siblings you have the
26These authors argue that raising children is labor intensive which is why it accounts for the negative relationship
with the mother’s labor market participation, particularly in the short run.
22more likely you are to have and expect more kids. Blacks tend to have more kids, and immigration
status and mothers immigration status has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the number of kids you have,
while fathers immigration status has a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the number of kids you
have and expect to have.27
The p-values for the F-test of whether variables in sub-categories are all equal to zero
are reported at the bottom of Table 3. The diploma variables, the regional variables and the
ethnic origin variables all reject the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients are all zero for each of the
regressions, implying that education, location, and ethnicity inﬂuence the number of kids you have
and expect to have.28 On the other hand, the null hypothesis for the year variables is rejected
for expected number of kids but not for actual number of kids. The null hypothesis that all the
coeﬃcients on the city size variables are zero is rejected for the actual number of kids but failed to
be rejected for the expected number of kids.
Also reported at the bottom of Table 3 is the p-value for the Hausman test, which tests
whether there is any signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the OLS regression and the IV regression for
the estimated coeﬃcients on SELFE and SPOUSEH. Under the null hypothesis that there is no
endogeneity bias to self-employment status and whether the respondents spouse stays at home, the
estimated coeﬃcients on these two variables should be the same across the OLS and IV estimation
methods, with the exception that the IV estimate would be less eﬃcient. If, however, the estimates
using OLS and IV are diﬀerent, then this would indicate evidence against the null hypothesis of no
endogeneity bias. The results using the actual number of kids as the dependent variable suggests
that there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the IV and OLS estimates of these key variables,
which suggests that we do not have any endogeneity problems. However, when the expected
number of kids is the dependent variable, there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the OLS and the
IV regression at the .10 level, which suggests that the IV regression will provide a more accurate
27Previous research such as Borjas (1986), and Fairlie and Meyer (1996), has found that several immigrant groups
have a statistically higher self-employment rate than the native born. While we do not show a statistical positive
correlation between immigration status and self-employment it could be due to the low number of observations or the
fact that we did not distinguish directly between diﬀerent immigrant groups, though we do control for a respondents
ethnic origin.
28In particular, the city size and Census Region variables – New England, Mid- Atlantic, Central NE, Central NW,
South Atlantic, Central SE, Central SW, and Paciﬁc – proxy for the fact that environmental factors may explain
diﬀerences in birth rates – see Shultz (1969).
23estimate of the eﬀect of self-employment status on family size. The ﬁnal three rows of Table 3
provide further evidence that the IV regressions are meaningful. The row denoted J-test is the
orthogonality test between the estimated residuals and the instruments. The p-value indicates that
there is no evidence to suspect that the instruments are correlated with the error term. Finally,
the p-values denoted SELFE and SPOUSEH are the p-value from an F-test of the null hypothesis
that in a linear regression of each of these variables on the instruments, that all the coeﬃcients on
the instruments would be jointly equal to zero. As such, this type of test indicates whether the
instruments are correlated with the potentially endogenous regressors. As the p-values indicate,
however, the instruments are statistically signiﬁcant predictors of SELFE and SPOUSEH.
While the results in Table 3 provide consistently strong ﬁndings in support of the theory’s
prediction, the results in Table 4 provide additional results to show the robustness of our ﬁndings.
For example, in columns (I) through (X) of Table 4, we present both OLS and IV estimates of the
coeﬃcients for sub-samples where respondents report that KIDS is positive, the respondent’s spouse
stays at home (SPOUSEH = 1), the respondent is currently in his ﬁrst marriage (MAR1=1), for
respondents that are not in the agricultural industry (AG=0), and for respondents that are not
immigrants nor are their parents (IMGRNT=0).29 To keep the number of results to a minimum,
the dependent variable in each of these speciﬁcations is KIDSTOT.30
Estimating the relationship between self-employment and family size over these sub-samples
is helpful for a number of reasons. First, individuals may not have a particularly precise idea of
their preferred family size (KIDSTOT) until they actually have some children (KIDS > 0). Note,
however, that the results in columns (I) and (II) are very similar to those for the full sample.
Second, since a prime determinant of whether a spouse stays at home is whether they have children
(and or whether they have a larger number of children), the potential endogeneity of the variable
SPOUSEH may be worrisome. Indeed, as shown in Table 3, while the coeﬃcient on SPOUSEH is
29Interestingly, Friedlander and Silver (1967) ﬁnd that as a country’s fraction of self-employed non-farm population
rises, that their fertility rate rises. Though they do not provide an explanation for this ﬁnding other than to conjecture
that there are lower child rearing costs for the self-employed, this fact is consistent both with our theory and empirical
work on individual household behavior. See footnote 20 for our argument why this is not likely to be an explanation
for our ﬁnding.
30To note, the results are similar when KIDS is used as the dependent variable.
24Table 4: Additional Regression on Total Number of Children (KIDSTOT)
SAMPLE KIDS > 0 SPOUSEH = 1 MAR1 = 1
ESTIMATOR OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV ) (V ) (V I)
SELFE .176∗∗∗ .605∗∗∗ .161 1.034∗∗∗ .103∗ .576∗∗∗
(.059) (.182) (.113) (.372) (.061) (.197)
SPWRKH .270∗∗∗ −.075 .366∗∗∗ .773
(.048) (.608) (.053) (.545)
FINRELA − .084∗∗∗ − .091∗∗∗ −.083 −.098 −.050 −.050
(.028) (.029) (.054) (.062) (.031) (.032)
JEWISH −.186 −.309∗ .013 −.172 −.027 −.186
(.164) (.167) (.285) (.272) (.174) (.182)
CATHOLIC .189∗∗∗ .215∗∗∗ .285∗∗∗ .327∗∗∗ .258∗∗∗ .250∗∗∗
(.057) (.058) (.107) (.120) (.061) (.063)
AGE .056∗∗∗ .047 .096∗∗ .085∗ .054∗∗ .064∗∗
(.023) (.035) (.045) (.045) (.026) (.033)
AGE2/100 −.074∗∗∗ − .064∗∗∗ − .123∗∗∗ − .122∗∗∗ − .076∗∗∗ − .088∗∗∗
(.013) (.023) (.021) (.021) (.014) (.022)
GENERATION −.018∗∗ −.022∗∗ −.008 −.013 −.010∗∗ −.005
(.008) (.011) (.016) (.016) (.009) (.011)
LMEX .020 .013 .035 .035 .036∗ .039∗
(.019) (.020) (.037) (.037) (.021) (.021)
SIBS .048∗∗∗ .055∗∗∗ .065∗∗∗ .065∗∗∗ .052∗∗∗ .051∗∗∗
(.011) (.012) (.019) (.019) (.012) (.012)
BLACK .572∗∗ 2.629∗∗ .824∗ .978∗∗ .995∗∗ 1.007∗∗∗
(.292) (1.138) (.456) (.496) (.307) (.311)
WHITE −.085 −.173 .133 .213 .097 .124
(.160) (.173) (.295) (.328) (.153) (.154)
IMGRNTR .052 .068 .110 .112 .088 .094
(.131) (.128) (.260) (.250) (.153) (.158)
IMGRNTPA −.154 −.147 −.214 −.208 −.234∗∗ −.253∗∗
(.097) (.105) (.159) (.154) (.104) (.110)
IMGRNTMA −.024 −.005 −.193 −.207 −.060 −.065
(.105) (.106) (.190) (.183) (.120) (.123)
NOBS 3780 3780 1436 1436 3360 3360
p-values
YEARS .000 .000 .121 .126 .000 .000
City Size .601 .178 .209 .425 .397 .575
Diplomas .001 .009 .080 .047 .005 .179
Region .000 .000 .008 .008 .000 .000
Ethnic Origin .000 .129 .000 .030 .001 .001
Hausman .015 .014 .037
J-test .562 .270 .845
SELFE .126 .000 .000
SPOUSEH .100 .014
Note: See following page.
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Table 4: Additional Regression on Total Number of Children (KIDSTOT)
SAMPLE AG = 0 IMGRNT = 0 ALL ALL ALL
ESTIMATOR OLS IV OLS IV TOBIT IV TOBIT OPRBT
(V II) (V III) (IX) (X) (XI) (XII) (XIII)
SLFEMPR .144∗∗∗ .494∗ .116∗ .645∗∗∗ .155∗∗ .499∗∗∗ .120∗∗∗
(.065) (.263) (.066) (.195) (.063) (.190) (.045)
SPWRKH .343∗∗∗ .087 .408∗∗∗ .280 .400∗∗∗ .131 .272∗∗∗
(.051) (.717) (.057) (.713) (.052) (.683) (.037)
FINRELA − .084∗∗∗ − .090∗∗∗ −.075∗∗ −.076∗∗ − .077∗∗∗ −.082∗∗ −.048∗∗
(.030) (.031) (.032) (.033) (.031) (.033) (.022)
JEWISH −.112 −.211 −.088 −.207 −.068 −.162 −.090
(.179) (.190) (.229) (.236) (.210) (.217) (.144)
CATHOLIC .221∗∗∗ .243∗∗∗ .269∗∗∗ .285∗∗∗ .250∗∗∗ .263∗∗∗ .182∗∗∗
(.060) (.062) (.065) (.065) (.063) (.065) (.044)
AGE .082∗∗∗ .066∗ .069∗∗ .054 .091∗∗∗ .078∗∗ .066∗∗∗
(.024) (.036) (.027) (.039) (.024) (.037) (.017)
AGESQ/100 − .095∗∗∗ − .088∗∗∗ − .094∗∗∗ − .091∗∗∗ − .106∗∗∗ − .100∗∗∗ − .072∗∗∗
(.014) (.024) (.015) (.024) (.014) (.024) (.010)
GENERATION −.014 −.019 −.012 −.013 −.013 −.016 −.010
(.008) (.013) (.009) (.013) (.010) (.014) (.006)
LMEX .021 .026 .035 .046∗∗ .027 .031 .013
(.020) (.020) (.023) (.023) (.018) (.019) (.013)
SIBS .048∗∗∗ .047∗∗∗ .053∗∗∗ .053∗∗∗ .051∗∗∗ .052∗∗∗ .033∗∗∗
(.011) (.011) (.012) (.013) (.008) (.008) (.006)
RACEBL .742∗∗ .750∗∗ .816∗∗ 1.290 .786∗∗∗ .831∗∗∗ .445∗∗
(.301) (.298) (.400) (1.469) (.273) (.276) (.196)
RACEWH .014 .015 .247 .736 .007 .038 .029
(.166) (.162) (.274) (.634) (.173) (.175) (.116)
IMGRNTR .144 .153 .204 .225 .145
(.143) (.141) (.167) (.169) (.103)
IMGRNTPA −.191∗ −.187∗ − .272∗∗∗ − .251∗∗∗ −.173∗∗∗
(.101) (.110) (.104) (.112) (.074)
IMGRNTMA −.111 −.103 −.095 −.117 −.073
(.110) (.111) (.112) (.114) (.080)
NOBS 4036 4036 3407 3407 4220 4220 4220
p-values
YEARS .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
City Size .228 .236 .462 .439 .111 .117 .235
Diplomas .002 .028 .017 .183 .004 .024 .008
Region .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Ethnic Origin .001 .008 .001 .168 .007 .009 .000
Hausman .141 .005 .078
J-test .236 .645 .820
SELFE .000 .000 .001
SPOUSEH .038 .098 .046
Note: See following page.
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Table 4: Additional Regression on Total Number of Children (KIDSTOT)
Note: See Tables 1, 2 and 3. In columns denoted OLS, IV, TOBIT, IVTOBIT and OPRBT, the
coeﬃcients were estimated using ordinary least squares, instrumental variables, tobit, instrumental
variables tobit, and ordered probit, respectively. As in Tables 1 and 3, the data set only includes
only married males who are not retired, nor are their spouses (MALES† & MAR). In columns (I)
and (II), the data set removes respondents who have no current children. In columns (III) and
(IV), the data set includes only those respondents whose spouses stay at home. In columns (V)
and (VI), the data set includes only those respondents who have been married once. In columns
(VII) and (VIII), the data set removes respondents in the agricultural industry. In columns (IX)
and (X), the data set removes respondents who are immigrants or if either of their parents were
immigrants.
statistically signiﬁcant in the OLS regressions, it is not so in the IV ones.31 Interestingly, as
shown in columns (III) and (IV) of Table 4, the OLS estimate of the coeﬃcient on SELFE is
insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, although the IV estimate is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at
the .01 level. Moreover, the IV estimate on the coeﬃcient on SELFE is quite large – i.e. it predicts
that for respondents with stay at home spouses, self-employed have over 1.0 additional children
than do the non-self-employed. Third, we report estimates for the sub-sample of male respondents
who are currently married and have never been married before (MAR1).32 This sub-sample is
important since the relationship between respondents and children from prior marriages may cloud
the empirical relationships that we are attempting to investigate. However, as demonstrated in
columns (V) and (VI), the estimated speciﬁcation is very close to that for the full sample – see
Table 3 columns (III) and (IV). Furthermore, as emphasized by Fairlie and Meyer (1996, 2000), we
re-explore our empirical ﬁndings by removing respondents who are in the agricultural industry. As
shown in columns (VII) and (VIII) of Table 4, however, the empirical results are virtually identical
when these respondents are removed from the sample.33 As a ﬁnal attempt to demonstrate the
31 Of course, this is hampered by the fact that number of children is often an instrument for whether a spouse
stays at home. For example, see the survey in Blau (1998).
32The data is similar to that in Table 3 – that is, neither the respondent nor his spouse are retired or in school.
33While the level of statistical signiﬁcance is no longer at below the .05 level, it is signiﬁcant at the .06 level.
27robustness of our ﬁndings across sub-samples, columns (IX) and (X) report the model’s estimates
when respondents who are immigrants or whose parents are immigrants are removed from the
sample. Such a control is of interest since respondents whose parents are immigrants are more
likely to be self-employed: see Table 1. However, as shown in columns (IX) and (X), the results
are unchanged from our baseline set of results when we remove respondents who are immigrants or
whose parents were immigrants from the sample.34
Table 4 also allows for a few changes to the econometric approach to estimating our basic
speciﬁcation. In particular, since the number of children is bounded below by zero, one may wonder
whether our estimates are impacted by directly incorporating this into our estimation procedure.
To this end, column (XI) and (XI) report Tobit and Instrumental Variables Tobit estimates of
the key parameters. As the results suggest, however, the using this more sophisticated approach
provides estimates and levels of signiﬁcance almost identical to that using OLS and IV as presented
in Table 3. Finally, in column (XIII) of Table 4, we re-estimate our speciﬁcation using an Ordered
Probit model. Such an estimator would directly incorporate the fact that the number of children
discrete. Once again, however, the estimated pattern of signs and statistical signiﬁcance are similar
to our baseline estimates in Table 3.
3.3 Remarks
Taken together, the results in Tables 3 and 4 conﬁrm the broad evidence presented in Table 2: self-
employed households tend to have more children. We have demonstrated this result to be robust
over key sub-samples of the data as well as to alternative methods for estimating the parameters.
As such, we believe we have demonstrated that there is strong evidence in favor of our theory which
is predicated on the idea that self-employed households increase their number of children in order
to improve their chances of ﬁnding a match that improves the value of the business.
Nevertheless, doubts about the link between our theory and the evidence may persist. And
Moreover, the estimated coeﬃcient value is very similar to that in our baseline speciﬁcation in Table 3, although the
larger estimated standard error is consistent with the smaller sample size.
34Though not shown, the results are also unchanged when the sample is just whites who were not immigrants nor
were there parents.
28perhaps reasonably so. For example, one may conjecture that non-pecuniary beneﬁts of having
children may be higher for the self-employed for at least two reasons. First, the possibility exists
that individuals may choose to be self-employed because the self-employed spend less time at work,
which then allows them to spend more time with their children. Unfortunately, while we cannot
fully test this hypothesis with the GSS data, there is some evidence in the GSS data that suggests
just the opposite: namely, that the self-employed work more hours than fewer hours. For example,
the GSS asked the following question: “How many hours did you work last week ”. Interestingly, the
simple correlations between KIDS and KIDSTOT with HOURS are −.013 and −.021, respectively,
neither of which is statistically diﬀerent from zero. However, the correlation between SELFE and
HOURS is .092, which is statistically diﬀerent from zero at below the .0001 level.35 Put in another
light, the average hours of worked for the self-employed is over 49 hours per week, while that for the
non self-employed is around 45. Hence, more time spent at work suggests that self-employment does
not free up extra hours with which to spend with one’s children, the latter which would generally
be expected to be associated with respondents who prefer larger families. Finally, this mean gap of
about 4 hours per week remains statistically signiﬁcant even if we include all the control variables
used in our control for all the explanatory variables in our estimating equation (5).36
However, while self-employed respondents may work about 10 percent more hours than non
self-employed respondents, perhaps there is a sense in which these jobs are more family friendly.
Of course, while self-employment does provide some job ﬂexibility (i.e. as your own boss you don’t
have to ‘punch a clock’), the additional hours of work are likely to make other labor-leisure trade-
oﬀs more diﬃcult to manage.37 The GSS actually provides a number of questions, though only for
a limited time period, about the extent to which work may impinge upon family obligations. For
example, in 1996, the GSS asked respondents whether work had ever made them ‘miss a family
occasion or holiday,’ ‘been unable to care for a sick child or relative’, or ‘been unable to do the work
you usually do around the house’. Also, in 1998 they asked how important were ‘the person’s family
35Again the sample is for MALE respondents, who are currently married, and neither they nor their spouses are
retired or in school. Since fewer responded to the hours question, the number of observations is about 3800.
36In other words, when we replace Ni with HOURS in regression (5), we ﬁnd an eﬀect equal to 3.8 hours with
a robust t-statistic of 6.8. Moreover, this estimate and level of signiﬁcance is unchanged even if we also include the
instrument variables Z, which include industry dummy variables for the respondent.
37Hamilton (2000) reports that the self-employed tend to earn less and work more than individuals with similar
employment situations.
29responsibilities?’ Importantly, the responses to these questions were all insigniﬁcantly correlated
with the respondent’s self-employment status at or below the .1 level. Hence, self-employment
(at least for the male sub-sample we have considered) is not a bargain with respect to increased
ﬂexibility towards family commitments. As such, this lessens the weight behind the criticism that
households choose self employment in response to a larger actual or expected family size.38
4 Conclusion
Self-employed entities face unique challenges that separate them from other publicly-owned en-
terprises. Aside from the proﬁt-maximizing objective, self-employed individuals are typically con-
cerned with ensuring that the business stays within the family. Reconciling the two objectives,
namely, the success of the business and the control of the family over the business, implies that the
parent must try to ﬁnd a match among his children that would also guarantee the success of the
business.
We provide a theory whereby self-employed households have an inducement to have more
children in order to raise the expected return to their business. The important mechanism which
generates this is that having more children can increase the likelihood that an inside family member
will be a good match at running the business. Using data from the General Social Survey, we ﬁnd
empirical support for this ﬁnding. That is, overall, we demonstrate that there is a strong empirical
relationship between a respondent’s family size and self-employment status. We ﬁnd that, ceteris
paribus, the self-employed have between .2 to .4 more actual and total (that is, actual plus expected)
children than do the non-self-employed. This ﬁnding holds across a broad array of sub-samples in
simple tests of the diﬀerences in means. It also holds in empirical regressions when control variables
are included, and when the self-employment status of the respondent and whether the respondent’s
spouse stays at home are all allowed to be endogenous.
38In a recent important contribution, Frey and Benz (2003) provide evidence from Germany, the U.K. and Switzer-
land that self-employed are happier with their work not due to better ﬁnancial outcomes, but rather because of non-
pecuniary beneﬁts such as their work’s independence and lower level of hierarchy. This work extends Blanchﬂower
and Oswald’s (1998) and Blanchﬂower’s (2000) ﬁnding that the self-employed are happier than similarly employed
workers.
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32Data Appendix: Variables Used in the Analysis
Key Variables of Interest
KIDS The number of children respondent has ever had (includes those born from a previous
marriage).
KIDSTOT The number of children respondent has plus the additional number they expect to
have.
SELFE Dummy variable 1 if self-employed 0 if works for someone else.
Additional Control Variables
AGE Age of Respondent.
BLACK Dummy variable 1 if race is black, and 0 otherwise.
BMAR Dummy variable 1 if respondent has ever been married, and 0 otherwise.
CATHOLIC Dummy variable 1 if religion preference is Catholic, and 0 otherwise.
CTYSZ1 Dummy variable 1 if population at which interview took place is less than 10,000, and
0 otherwise.
CTYSZ2 Dummy variable 1 if population at which interview took place is greater than or equal
to 10,000 but less than 100,000, and 0 otherwise.
CTYSZ3 Dummy variable 1 if population at which interview took place is greater than or equal
to 100,000 but less than 1 million, and 0 otherwise.
CTYSZ4 Dummy variable 1 if population at which interview took place is greater than or equal
to 1 million but less than 9 million 0 otherwise.
DIPHR(S) Dummy variable 1 if respondent’s (spouse) highest degree received was from a high-
school or GED certiﬁcate, and 0 if not.
DIPJCR(S) Dummy variable 1 if respondent’s (spouse) highest degree received was from a junior
college, and 0 if not.
DIPBAR(S) Dummy variable 1 if respondent’s (spouse) highest degree received was from a 4
year college, and 0 if not.
DIPHGDR(S) Dummy variable 1 if respondent’s (spouse) highest degree received was from a
Graduate School, and 0 if not.
Ethnic Origin The Country the respondent’s ancestors came from: Africa, Austria, French Canada,
Other Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, England, Wales, Finland, France, Germany,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Dutch Holland, Norway, Philippi-
ans, Poland, Puerto Rico, Russia, Scotland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, West Indies, Other.
33FINRELA The respodent’s household ﬁnancial income relative to others. It is measured on a self
reported scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being that your ﬁnancial status is well below the mean, and
5 being that it is far above the mean.
IMGRNT Dummy variable 1 if respondent was not born in the U.S., and 0 otherwise.
IMGRNTMA Dummy variable 1 if respondents mother was not born in the U.S., and 0 otherwise.
IMGRNTPA Dummy variable 1 if respondents father was not born in the U.S., and 0 otherwise.
Industry Agriculture, Mining, Construction, Manufacturing, Transportation, Wholesale, Retail,
Finance (Finance, Insurance and Real Estate), Entertainment, PROFESSIONAL (Profes-
sional Services), Administration.
JEWISH Dummy variable 1 if religion preference is Jewish , and 0 otherwise.
LMEX Respondent’s labor market experience. Equal to Age minus years of school minus 6.
MALES Dummy variable 1 if male, and 0 if female.
MALES† Dummy variable 1 if MALES and if neither respondent nor spouse are in school or
retired, and 0 otherwise.
MAR Dummy variable 1 if currently married, and 0 otherwise.
MAR1 Dummy variable 1 if respondent is currently married or widowed and never been previously
married, and 0 otherwise.
PROTESTANT Dummy variable 1 if religion preference is Protestant, and 0 otherwise.
SIBS Number of siblings respondent has (includes those no longer alive, stepbrothers, stepsisters
and children adopted by parents).
YRSCHR Number of years of schooling.
WHITE Dummy variable 1 if race is white, and 0 otherwise.
Regions New England, Mid-Atlantic, Central NE (North East), Central SE (South East), South
Atlantic, Central SE, Central SW, and Paciﬁc.
SPWRKH Dummy variable 1 if respondents spouse work status a week prior to the interview is
either taking care of the house or student, and 0 if spwrk = 1.
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